Rawls, Nozick and The Presumption of "A Necessary Evil"

The problem with both Rawls and Nozick is that they build their argument by presuming the idea of a "necessary evil". They both begin with a presumption that there has to exist a necessary evil. To badly simplify it, Rawls argues that the inequities resulting from such necessary evil can be removed by redistribution mechanisms. Nozick argues that any such effort of redistribution will do little to reduce inequalities as people will exchange again, and so we should allow market forces to act as they would. There is no stopping creation of inequalities, and we should give up fighting it because it is the way of things.

My problem really is this presumption of necessary evil. The question I am therefore asking is that can we create a system whereby the necessary evil does not have to exist in the first place? 

In the legal fraternity especially I have noticed that this question is strongly answered with a NO.

Maybe a lot of it has to do with the failure of other systems like Marx's communism and early anarchism which said they could establish a system without a necessary evil aspect.

But as I understand these systems did not exactly fail on grounds of raising this question- i think there are other factors. I think it is rather a rejection of an argument by association with another failing argument. Mark, association, but not co-dependence.

But well.

Anyhow i think this presumption needs a thorough re-examination. For instance in the area of intellectual property: "knowledge monopoly is a necessary evil", law and development: "let's maximise GDP growth first then we can think about redistribution"--the GDP maximisation being a necessary evil, etc.

Not least in political-legal theories about "The State is a necessary evil". But that comes later. Much later.

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